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THE WISCONSIN IDEA IN
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
KENNETH K. LucE*
State administrative organization in Wisconsin functions within a
constitutional and statutory framework typical in the American states.
The constitution in separate articles allocates executive, legislative,2
and judicial power 3 among distinct government departments. An article
denominated "administrative" provides for a secretary of state, treas-
urer, attorney general, and certain county officers. 4 Another creates a
state superintendent of public instruction.5 With these exceptions, all
the seventy and more agencies exercising statewide jurisdiction, and
hundreds with only local jurisdiction, have been created by statutes en-
acted progressively as time and necessity have required in each field
of regulation. A few agencies are almost as old as the constitution."
The constitutional problems concerning permissible scope of legisla-
tive delegation of power were presented early for decision in Wiscon-
sin. In Dowling v. Lancashire Insurance Company7 a land mark case
which severely restricted administrative rule making, the Courts in-
validated a statute authorizing the Insurance Commissioner to pre-
scribe a standard form of fire insurance policy, and the standard policy
in Wisconsin is still prescribed by legislative act. Soon thereafter an-
other decision invalidated a state board of health order prohibiting
unvaccinated children from attending school.'0 Nevertheless the Court
later sustained several statutes containing delegation at least as broad
as that invalidated in the Dowling case. Notably these later decisions
included those sustaining the powers of the Civil Service Commission,"
* A.B., J.D., University of Michigan; Associate Professor of Law, Marquette
University Law School. This paper received honorable mention in the State
Administrative Law Essay Contest conducted recently by the Section of Ad-
ministrative Law of the American Bar Association.
1 Wis. Const., Art. V, Sec. 1.
2 Wis. Const, Art. IV, Sec. 1.
3 Wis. Const., Art. VII, Sec. 2.
4 Wis. Const., Art. VI.
5 Wis. Const., Art. X, Sec. 1.
6 Local tax boards of review, Laws 1868, Ch. 130, Sect 25; see Phillips v. City
of Stevens Point, 25 Wis. 594 (1870).
792 Wis. 63, 65 N.W. 738 (1896).
8 References in this paper to "the Court" are to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin.
9 Wis. Stat., 203.01 (1949).
10 State ex rel. Adams v. Burdge, 95 Wis. 390, 70 N.W. 347, 37 L.R.A. 157 (1897).
11 State ex rel. Buell v. Frear, 146 Wis. 291, 131 N.W.832 (1911).
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the Railroad Commission, 12 and the Securities Commission.' In Borg-
nis v. Falk Company the Court sustained the Industrial Commission
Act, and held the power to adjudicate private interests could be dele-
gated so long as court review at least the equivalent of certiorari re-
mained available.'
4
In 1928 another landmark appeared in Wisconsin Inspection Bureau
v. Whitman.15 Here the Court sustained the power of the Insurance
Commissioner to prescribe rules for an insurance rating bureau. It was
conceded the Dowling case had been ignored in later cases, and that
public necessity had revealed the constitutional propriety of a less
mechanical and literal enforcement of constitutional safeguards. Justice
Rosenberry stated :16
"For there can be no doubt that in sustaining laws which com-
bine legislative and judicial power in a single administrative
agency, we are on the way back to where we were when the
doctrine of the separation of powers was enunciated as a political
theory and before it had been wrought into our constitutional
system. A refusal to recognize the facts as they exist and to give
administrative law its rightful place in our legal theory has pre-
vented a logical and symmetrical development of that law. * * *
no doubt the whole field of administrative law has had an asym-
metrical development because of the fact that it had no recog-
nized place in our constitutional theory although it has of neces-
sity been accorded a place in our law. It may well be that the
nomenclature of the decisions should be retained and that kind
of legislative power which may be delegated should be called the
power to make rules and regulations, and that that kind of judi-
cial power which may be delegated should be called the power to
find facts, although the true significance of these terms should be
better understood."
Since the Whitman case decisions in other states invalidating leg-
islative delegation have not been reliable authority. For instance with
respect to New York decisions the Court has stated :17
"* * * the courts of the State of New York have adopted a very
much more stringent rule with respect to delegation of legislative
power than the rule announced by this court."
Nevertheless the first blue sky law was declared unconstitutional'"
because it delegated power to the Railroad Commission to "make such
* * * award as may be just and equitable", language which described the
12 Minn. St. P. & S. S. M. Ry. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 136 Wis. 146, 116
N.W. 905 (1908).
1 Kreutzer v. Westphal, 187 Wis. 463, 204 N.W. 595 (1925).
14 Borgnis v. Falk Co., 147 Wis. 327, 133 N.W. 209 (1911).
15 196 Wis. 472, 220 N.W. 929 (1928).
16 196 Wis. 472 at 499-500, 220 N.W. 929 (1928).
17 Modern System Dentists v. State Board of Dental Examiners, 216 Wis. 190 at
193, 256 N.W. 922 (1934).
18 Klein v. Barry, 182 Wis. 255, 196 N.W. 457 (1923).
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very function of a court.19 Primarily the defect was faulty draftman-
ship. Department of Securities power to make "such rules and regu-
lations as may be necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for
the protection of investors,"2 0 illustrates the permissible scope of dele-
gated power in Wisconsin today. It might be stated that delegation of
legislative power will now be sustained where the policy standard is
expressed in the clearest practicable language, if possible in language
with defined legal meaning al where the subject matter of regulation
is such that the legislature practicably cannot handle it directly or
through a constitutional government agency ;22 and where public neces-
sity for regulation clearly outweighs the private interest affected.
2 3
Wisconsin statutes creating administrative agencies are dated over
almost a century, and each one prescribes details of practice and pro-
cedure, and frequently a method of judicial review.2 4 Such background
alone sufficiently suggests wide diversity between agencies in practice,
procedure, and judicial review. Obviously the greatest practicable uni-
formity in such matters as among all agencies is of paramount impor-
tance in the development of any settled body of administrative law, and
of obvious interest to the practicing lawyer. To some extent such
uniformity develops through legislative tendency to carry from existing
statutes into new statutes workable sections which have received ju-
dicial approval and content. In our system constitutional limitations
have proved a compelling force toward uniformity. The separation
of powers doctrine, inherent in the state constitution, insures minimum
court review of all administrative action,2 5 and minimum standards for
procedure are guaranteed by the constitutional concepts of equal pro-
tection and due process. 26
The writer intends to note the extent to which these factors have
produced a settled and uniform body of administrative law in Wiscon-
sin, and to appraise the contribution of the Administrative Procedure
39 See also Kelly v. Tomahawk Motor Co., 206 Wis. 568 at 573, 240 N.W. 141
(1932).
20Wis. Stat. 189.17(2) (1949).
21 Clintonville Transfer Line v. Public Service Commission, 248 Wis. 59 at 72,
21 N.W. (2d) 5 (1945), where the Court considers the "public convenience
and necessity" standard.22 Minn. St. P. & S. S. M. Ry. Co..v. Railroad Commission, 136 Wis. 146 at 159,
116 N.W. 905, 17 L.R.A. (ns) 821 (1908).
23 Wisconsin Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commission, 206 Wis. 589, 240
N.W. 411 (1932); Modern System Dentists v. State Board of Dental Exam-
iners, 216 Wis. 190, 256 N.W. 922 (1934).
24 Boards of Review, Laws 1868, Ch. 130, Sec. 25; Board of Dental Examiners,
Laws 1885, Ch. 129; State Board of Agriculture, Laws 1897, Ch. 301; Banking
Department, Laws 1897, Ch. 303; Civil Service Commission, Laws 1905, Ch.
363; Railroad Commission, Laws 1905, Ch. 362.
25 Borgnis v. Falk Co., 147 Wis. 327 at 360, 133 N.W. 209 (1911) ; State ex rel.
Inspection Bureau v. Whitman, 196 Wis. 472 at 507-508, 220 N.W. 929 (1928);
Cranston v. Industrial Commission, 246 Wis. 287, 16 N.W. (2d) 865 (1944).
26 U.S. Const., Amend. 14, Sec. 1; Wis. Const., Art. 1, Sec. 9.
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Act,2 7 enacted in 1943, in this direction. This statute was enacted in
Wisconsin substantially in the form approved in 1946 by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws as the Model
State Administrative Procedure Act.28 In Wisconsin it was the first
attempt to prescribe uniformly for a group of agencies standard rules
to govern procedure and review. It is significant that the Act did not
affect local agencies, but only those with state-wide jurisdiction. Cer-
tain state-wide agencies also were excepted, namely the Department of
Taxation as to public utility tax assessment, and the Industrial Com-
mission as to workmen's and unemployment compensation.29
THE PROCEDURE OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION
(1) The requirement of notice and hearing. The Supreme Court
of Wisconsin has stated :so
"Unless some care is exercised to preserve the distinction be-
tween legislative and judicial power when exercised by adminis-
trative bodies, the division of the government into coordinate
departments will become meaningless."
This is so because many important legal consequences depend upon
determination of the nature of the power exercised as legislative or
judicial, among them the constitutional necessity for notice and hear-
ing.31 For another example, under the Wisconsin constitution the courts
may exercise judicial power only, and may not modify an administra-
tive order considered legislative in nature, but must remand to the
agency for further proceedings. 32 The difficulty is that in some areas
of regulation the distinction blurs, but Wisconsin statutes and decisions
indicate notice and hearing generally have been provided in such doubt-
ful areas. Statutes. delegating power clearly judicial provide uniformly
for hearing, and hearing is provided and has been held constitutionally
essential in some statutes delegating power held legislative in nature.
Examples are the Public Service Commission powers to regulate utility
27 Wis. Stat., Ch. 227 (1949) ; Laws 1943, Ch. 375; Laws 1945, Ch. 511; Laws
1947, Ch. 411, Sec. 11. References in this paper to "the Act" are to the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act cited here.
28 See Hoyt, "The Wisconsin Administrative Procedure Act", 1944 Wis. L. Rev.
214.
29 Wis. Stat. 227.01(1) (1949).
30 Gateway City Transfer Co. v. Public Service Commission, 245 Wis. 304 at 307,
14 N.W. (2d) 6 (1944).
s1 See Armory Realty Co. v. Olsen, 210 Wis. 281 at 297, 246 N.W. 513 (1933);
Folding Furniture Works v. Wis. L.R. Board, 232 Wis. 170 at 191, 285 N.W.
851, 286 N.W. 875 (1939) ; State ex rel. Inspection Bureau v. Witman, 196 Wis.
472 at 499, 220 N.W. 929 (1928) ; Gateway City Transfer Co. v. Public Service
Commission, 245 Wis. 304, 14 N.W. (2d) 6 (1944).32 Clintonville Transfer Line v. Public Service Commission, 248 Wis. 59 at 77,
21 N.W. (2d) 5 (1945); Fort Howard Paper Co. v. Fox River Heights Sani-
tary District, 250 Wis. 145, 26 N.W. (2d) 661 (1947) ; State ex rel. Schleck v.
Zoning Board of Appeals, 254 Wis. 42, 35 N.W. (2d) 312 (1948).
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rates,38 and to issue certificates of public convenience to motor car-
riers.34 Other examples are the hearings provided interested parties
prior to issue of general orders of the Committee on Water Polution, 3
and the hearings available after issuance of general rules by the Depart-
ment of Securities.38 Occupational license statutes provide generally
for hearing on revocation, but hearing before revocation may be un-
necessary in cases of extreme public interest in prompt action.3 7 An
officer who summarily destroys livestock under the mistaken impression
is is diseased may be held personally liable in a later damage action.'
Further collateral attack is possible through action against agency
officials for injunction" or mandamus. 40
(2) General content of the hearing requirement. Where agency
statutes provide for hearing they are occasionally explicit with respect
to such procedural matters as notice, preparation of a record, and op-
portunity to cross examine and confront witnesses,4 1 but more often
the right to hearing is stated without more.42 Generally the statutory
system before the Administrative Procedure Act contained nothing
beyond coincidental similarity between agency statutes calculated to
promote uniformity in hearing procedure, and the attorney could insist
only upon minimum procedural steps required by due process. In the
important Wisconsin Telephone Company rate case, the Court stated
that administrative due process does not require formal court hearing
but only observance of the essentials of common law hearing.43 These
were outlined as: (1) the right to reasonable notice of the charge; (2)
opportunity to meet it by competent evidence; and (3) the right to be
33 Wisconsin Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commission, 232 Wis. 274 at 288,
293, 287 N.W. 122, 593 (1939), cert. den. 309 U.S. 657, 84 L.Ed. 1006, 60 S.Ct
514 (1940). The Court stated that to authorize rate orders without hearing
would be to confer unlimited arbitrary power to take utility property.
34 Gateway City Transfer Co. v. Public Service Commission, 245 Wis. 304, 14
N.W. (2d) 6 (1944); Clintonville Transfer Line v. Public Service Commis-
sion, 248 Wis. 59 at 77, 21 N.W. (2d) 5 (1945) ; Gateway City Transfer Co.
v. Public Service Commission, 253 Wis. 397, 34 N.W. (2d) 238 at 242, 248(1948).
35 Wis. Stat., 144.53(4) (1949).
36 Wis. Stat., 189.22 (1949). See also Wis. Stat., 145.02(2) (1949), requiring no-
tice and hearing by State Board of Health before issuing uniform plumbing
regulations.
37 State ex rel. Nowotny v. Milwaukee, 140 Wis. 38, 121 N.W. 658 (1909).38Lowe v. Conroy, 120 Wis. 151, 97 N.W. 942 (1904).
39 Wasserman v. City of Kenosha, 217 Wis. 223, 258 N.W. 857 (1935); Great
Lakes Tanning Co. v. Milwaukee, 250 Wis. 74, 26 N.W. (2) 152 (1946).
40 Jaswinski v. Milwaukee, 253 Wis. 17, 33 N.W. (2d) 224 (1948).
41 Hearing on revocation of real estate broker's license, Wis. Stat., 136.09 (1949);
revocation of optometry license, Wis. Stat., 153.09 (1949) ; Department of Ag-
riculture procedure, Wis, Stat., 93.18 (1949).
42 Securities Law, Wis. Stat., 189.22 (1949); revocation of pharmacist registra-
tion, Wis. Stat., 151.02(7) (1949); Public Service Commission, Wis. Stat.,
196.26 (1949).
43 Wisconsin Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commission, 232 Wis. 274 at 303,
287 N.W. 122, 593 (1939).
1950] .
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heard by counsel upon the evidence and law, and to oral argument. 44
In this case the Court decided the Public Service Commission denied
a hearing by making its rate order before the utility had opportunity
to present its case in full. The Administrative Procedure Act has added
emphasis to this case by requiring that all parties be "afforded oppor-
tunity for full, fair, public hearing after reasonable notice, ' 4 and it
has further contributed by prescribing certain definite requirements
as to hearing procedure in contested cases, where the agency statute
requires a hearing." The Wisconsin Act omits the provision of the
Model Act which requires notice where practicable and opportunity
for interested persons to submit data and views as a part of rule making
procedure.4 And perhaps certain hearings required by agency statute
will not be controlled by the Act because a contested case will not be
involved, for instance the hearing available after issuance of a general
rule by the Department of Securities. Some steps in hearing procedure
prescribed by the Act add little to standards prescribed in previous Wis-
consin cases, but others are definite contributions, and as to some of
the former the Court in recent decisions appears to be insisting upon
more complete agency compliance. These matters are considered in
following paragraphs.
(3) Publicity accorded administrative rules. In Wisconsin admin-
istrative rules have force of law where the statute authorizing issuance
so provides.48 The necessity for publication, discussed by one writer
in terms of government in ignorance of law,49 finds legal sanction in a
provision of the Wisconsin constitution that no general law shall be
in force until published.50 Compliance with this requirement is pre-
sumed until the contrary is proved,51 but certainly the need for com-
pliance explains at least in part the frequent statutory requirement that
agency rules be published in the official state paper prior to effective
date.52 In 1939 the Legislature provided for a supplement to the Wis-
44 Wisconsin Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commission, 232 Wis. 274 at 294,
287 N.W. 122, 593 (1939).
45 Wis. Stat., 227.07 (1949).
46 Wis. Stat., 227.07-227.14 incl. (1949).
47 Model State Administrative Procedure Act, Sec. 2(3).
48 State ex rel. Inspection Bureau v. Whitman, 196 Wis. 472 at 506 et seq., 220
N.W. 929 (1928) ; Modern System Dentists v. State Board of Dental Exam-
iners, 216 Wis. 190 at 197, 256 N.W. 922 (1934) ; Verbetch v. Huettl, 253 Wis.
510 at 519, 34 N.W. (2d) 803 (1948).
49 Griswold, "Government in Ignorance of the Law-A Plea for better Publica-
tion of Executive Legislation," 48 Harv. L. Rev. 198 (1934).
50 Wis. Const., Art. VII, Sec. 21.51 Whitman v. Department of Taxation, 240 Wis. 564 at 577-578, 4 N.W. (2d)
180 (1942).
52 Securities Law, Wis. Stat., 189.02(9) (1949); Industrial Commission, Wis.
Stat., 101.14(1) (1949); Department of Agriculture, Wis. Stat., 93.09(7), 93.
18(3) (1949) ; Motor Vehicle Department, Wis. Stat., 110.06(1) (1949) ; Em-
ployment Relations Board, Wis. Stat., 111.09 (1949).
[Vol. 34
WISCONSIN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
consin Statutes to contain the procedural and substantive rules of all
state-wide agencies. 53 This supplement is cited as the "Red Book", and
is now in its fifth edition. However it has followed the practice of
reference to the agency address, where copies of rules may be requested
but not always obtained, and has printed in full only the rules of the
larger agencies. The requirement in the Administrative Procedure Act
that state-wide agency rules be filed with the Secretary of State is
therefore a valuable contribution to the Wisconsin system because it
provides a central place where all agency rules may be available.5 4
(4) Responsibility of agency heads for decision. The Court has
held that an Industrial Commission order is invalid if a party can prove
in the statutory review proceeding that the Commissioners, upon peti-
tion, did not personally consider the record made before the examiner.55
Since workemen's compensation is excepted from the Act, these de-
cisions are not affected by it. In the Wisconsin Telephone Company
case,5 the commissioners were absent during much of the proceeding,
and the final order and findings were prepared by experts who were
witnesses on the trial. The Court held such practice does not deny due
process if the commission recognizes the doctrine of Morgan v. United
States5 7 that notice of expert findings must be served on the utility
an opportunity afforded for argument, a requirement satisfied in that
case through rehearing.58 The provision in the Administrative Proceed-
ure Act that where the agency members have not fully participated in
the hearing the parties be given opportunity to argue before them ex-
ceptions to the hearing officer's summary of evidence, statement of find-
ings and decision, serves to clarify the procedure prescribed generally
in the Wisconsin Telephone Company case.59
(5) Decisions based on material not included in the hearing or
record. The Administrative Procedure Act requires an official record
-53 Wis. Stat., 35.93 (1949).
.54Wis. Stat., 227.03 (1949). See 32 Op. Att'y Gen. 359 (1943), setting forth
classes of rules which must be filed.
55 State ex rel. Madison Airport Co. v. Wrabetz, 231 Wis. 147, 285 N.W. 504
(1939); Kaegi v. Industrial Commission, 232 Wis. 16, 285 N.W. 845 (1939);
Madison Airport Co. v. Industrial Commission, 231 Wis. 256, 285 N.W. 757
(1939).56 Wisconsin Telephone Company v. Public Service Commission, 232 Wis. 274,
287 N.W. 122, 593 (1939).
57304 U.S. 1, 58 S.Ct. 773, 82 L.Ed. 1129 (1938).58 Wisconsin Telephone Company v. Public Service Commission, 232 Wis. 274 at
314-317, 287 N.W. 122, 593 (1939).
59 Wis. Stat., 227.12 (1949). The Model Administrative Procedure Act, See. 10,
requires agency members personally to consider parts of the record cited by
parties. The Wisconsin Act substitutes the hearing officer's summary of evi-
dence. For approved procedure under the Wisconsin section see:" Gateway City
Transfer Co. v. Public Service Commission, 253 Wis. 397 at 408, 34 N.W. (2d)
238 at 243 (1948) ; and also Lake Superior D. P. Co. v. Public Service Com-
mission, 244 Wis. 543, 13 N.W. (2d) 89 (1944).
1950]
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in contested cases ;60 that agency records used in decision be made part
of such record;61 and that matters officially noticed be included and
parties notified in time to contest such notice during the hearing. 62 Use
of agency reports not in the record was condemned by the Court before
the Act, but was held not prejudicial error where other evidence in the
record supported the finding.63 The same principle is found in the
Act, which requires prejudice from error of law for reversal. 64 But
these new statutory requirements surely nullify the decision in Chicago
Northwestern Railway Company v. Railroad Commission65 which al-
lowed the commission to base rate decisions on cost compilations taken
from railroad reports in commission files but not offered in evidence.
(6) Written findings of fact and law. The Administrative Proced-
ure Act requires that decisions in contested cases be accompanied by
written findings of fact and law.66 Before the Act, the Court frequently
instructed agencies concerning this requirement and insisted upon care-
ful compliance.67 There is indication in decisions since the Act that the
Court considers the statutory provision a mandate for renewed insis-
tence upon well drafted, carefully considered findings.6 In a recent
decision the Court set aside a Public Service Commission order fixing
telephone rates, and directed the Commission to change its methods
with respect to the preparation of findings of fact.n
(7) Rules of Evidence. Wisconsin decisions recognize that hear-
say and other evidence inadmissible at common law may be admitted
where relevant in administrative proceedings, but only provided such
evidence has "some substantial probative force. ' 7  This appears sub-
stantially equivalent to the provisions of the Administrative Procedure
Act that evidence possessing "reasonable probative value" shall be ad-
mitted, but immaterial, irrelevant or unduly repetitious testimony
"shall" be excluded. 71 It should be emphasized that improper admission
60 Wis. Stat., 227.11 (1949).
61 Wis. Stat., 227.10(2) (1949).
62 Wis. Stat., 227.10(3) (1949).
63 Lupinski v. Industrial Commission, 188 Wis. 409, 206 N.W. 195 (1925).
64 Wis. Stat., 227.20(1) (1949).
65 156 Wis. 47, 145 N.W. 216 (1914).
66 Wis. Stat., 227.13 (1949).
67 Tesch v. Industrial Commission, 200 Wis. 616, 229 N.W. 194, (1930); Wis-
consin L. R. Board v. Fred Rueping Leather Co., 228 Wis. 473, 494, 279 N.W.
673, 117 A.L.R. 398 (1938); Folding Furniture Works v. Wisconsin L.R.
Board, 232 Wis. 170 at 180, 285 N.W. 851, 286 N.W. 875 (1939).
68 Clintonville Transfer Line v. Public Service Commission, 248 Wis. 59 at 80-81,
21 N.W. (2d) 5 (1945).
69 Commonwealth Telephone Company v. Public Service Commission, 252 Wis.
481, 32 N.W. (2d) 247 (1948) ; Motor Transport Co. v. Public Service Com-
mission, 253 Wis. 497, 34 N.W. (2d) 787 (1948).
70 Folding Furniture Works v. Wisconsin L.R. Board, 232 Wis. 170 at 188-189,
285 N.W. 851, 286 N.W. 875 (1939).
71 Wis. Stat., 227.10(1) (1949). The Model Administrative Procedure Act pro-
vides that such testimony "may"be excluded: Sec. 9(1).
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of evidence, although unlawful procedure, is not ground for reversal
unless substantial rights are prejudiced "2 This was true before the
Act.73 Nevertheless the Act should promote uniformity of practice as
among state-wide agencies, especially where agency statutes are silent,7'
or permit admission generally of "such testimony as may be pertinent
to the controversy." 75 The Employment Peace Act requires that Board
hearings be be "governed by the rules of evidence prevailing in courts
of equity. "76 This standard may be more strict than that imposed by
the Administrative Procedure Act, and may indicate a legislative trend
to enforce closer administrative adherence to rules of evidence, because
the former Labor Relations Act provided that "rules of evidence pre-
vailing in courts of law or equity shall not be controlling."
77
The Wisconsin Act omits the Model Act clause concerning the
right to cross examine witnesses, 3 and clearly permits introduction of
affidavits and other documents in agency files without cross examina-
tion of the authors.7 9
(8) Agency power of subpoena. Administrative agencies in Wis-
consin are given power of subpoena by general statute, 0 and usually
in the agency statute."' A recent decision holds that an agency order
overruling a motion to quash a subpoena is not reviewable. 2 Review of
such orders would promote undue confusion and delay in the admin-
istrative process. Thus in Wisconsin the person subpoened must com-
'ply or face a contempt citation.8 3
(9) Declaratory judgments and rulings. Before the Administra-
tive Procedure Act an individual contemplating activity subject to pos-
sible administrative regulation could obtain advance determination as
to his rights or duties only through an equity proceeding for injunction
against enforcement of the rule or rules involved. Such procedure was
cumbersome and expensive, and obtained decision only upon jurisdic-
72Wis. Stat., 227.20(1), 227.20(1) (c) (1949).
7sLupinski v. Industrial Commission, 188 Wis. 409, 206 N.W. 195 (1925). The
Court stated that erroneous consideration of an unsworn report would be basis
for reversal if the finding could not stand without reference to it.
74 Public Service Commission, Wis. Stat., 196.26 (1949) ; Department of Agricul-
ture, Wis. Stat., 93.18 (1949).
75 Wis. Stat., 152.06(4) (1949), dental license revocation hearing.
76 Wis. Stat., 111.07(3) (1949).
77 Wis. Stat., 111.10(2) (1937). The Employment Peace Act replaced the Labor
Relations Act in 1939, Laws 1939, Ch. 57.
78 Model State Administrative Procedure Act, Sec. 9(3).
7 Wis. Stat., 227.10(2) (1949).
BoWis. Stat., 325.01(4) (1949).
s Public Service Commission, Wis. Stat., 196.02(6) (1949); Department of Ag-
riculture, Wis. Stat., 93.14 (1949); Employment Relations Board, Wis. Stat.,
111.07 (2) (b) (1949).
82 State ex rel. St. Mary's Hospital v. Industrial Commission, 205 Wis. 516, 27
N.W. (2d) 478 (1949).
s3 Wis. Stat., 325.12 (1949).
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tional and constitutional questions.84 The court could not consider ap-
plicability of a rule to plaintiff or a particular set of facts.85 The
Administrative Procedure Act antiquates injunction procedure and sub-
stitutes two independent remedies. In either one advance determination
is available as to any administrative rule which does or threatens to im-
pair individual rights. First, the individual may petition for a declara-
tory judgment in the Dane County Circuit Court.8 6 Second, the Act pro-
vides for declaratory agency rulings in agency discretion, but binding
upon it and the parties, and subject to review as in other cases.8 7 With
issuance of such rulings in agency control the procedure should not
become burdensome or a nuisance, and could prove a distinct contribu-
tion toward efficient administrative justice.
METHOD AND SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
(1) Methods of review. Certain constitutional provisions have di-
rectly shaped procedure in judicial review of administrative action. The
Supreme Court is vested with appellate jurisdiction, and with superin-
tending control over inferior courts through such extraordinary writs
as mandamus and certiorari. 8 Original jurisdiction to review adminis-
istrative action is taken only in exceptional circumstances, 9 and then
only to review action in excess of jurisdiction. It seems questionable
whether the legislature could provide for appeal direct from an ad-
ministrative agency to the Supreme Court.90 Review of administrative
action has been held a "civil matter" within the constitutional jurisdic-
tion of the circuit courts,91 and the statutes generally have provided for
review by action in, or appeal to, the circuit courts. The Administrative
Procedure Act provides for review on the record in an action brought
by a person aggrieved by decision in a contested case9" in the Dane
84 Modern System Dentists v. State Board of Dental Examiners, 216 Wis. 190,
256 N.W. 922 (1934).
85 Ritholz v. Johnson, 246 Wis. 442, 17 N.W. (2d) 590 (1944).
86 Wis. Stat., 227.05 (1949) ; see Hecker v. Gunderson, 245 Wis. 655, 15 N.W.
(2d) 788 (1944).
87 Wis. Stat., 227.06 (1947). For example of use of this procedure see Lake Super-
ior D. P. Co. v. Public Service Commission, 250 Wis. 39, 26 N.W. (2d) 278,
170 A.L.R. 680 (1946).
88 Wis. Const., Art. VII, Sec. 3.
89 State ex rel. State Central Committee v. Board, 240 Wis. 204 at 214, 3 N.W.
(2d) 123 (1942).
10 Clintonville Transfer Line v. Public Service Commission, 248 Wis. 59 at 74-75,
21 N.W. (2d) 5 (1945).
91 Clintonville Transfer Line v. Public Service Commission, supra, at page 75.
92 An order of the Employment Relations Board for a referendum does not in-
volve a contested case, and the Union is not a person aggrieved: United R. &
W. DS. E. of A. v. Wisconsin E. R. Board, 245 Wis. 636, 15 N.W. (2d) 844
(1944). See Wis. Stat., 227.16 (1949) ; same result in case of order appointing
a conciliator: Wis. Tel. Co. v. Wis. E. R. Board, 253 Wis. 584, 34 N.W. (2d)
844 (1948).
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County Circuit Court, except in employment relations 3 and certain
other excepted cases where review may be in other circuit courts.-
An Employment Relations Board petition in Circuit Court for an en-
forcement order is a review proceeding on the record.9 5 Review in the
Supreme Court is on appeal from the Circuit Court as in other cases.99
Before the Administrative Procedure Act some statutes, typically
the Public Service Commission statute, provided for review by action
de novo in the Dane County Circuit Court,9 7 and others indicated
certiorari or other forms or were silent. Where the statute was silent
only common law certiorari was available.98 The Act expressly retained
two pre-existing forms of review, namely of workmen's compensation
on the record in the Dane County Circuit Court,9 and of Board of
Tax Appeals action in public utility property assessment by action
practically de novo "to redetermine the assessment ' ' 1°° in the same
court. With one exception all other state-wide agency statutes have
been amended to provide for review under the Administrative Proced-
ure Act, and such review procedure has been held exclusive. 10 1 The one
exception is the Examiners in Optometry statute which still prescribes
certiorari from the Dane County Circuit Court.10 2 This exception was
a legislative accident.
Methods of review of local agency action remain unchanged and
diverse. Existing procedure includes statutory appeal to, or action with
trial de novo in, a circuit or other court of record, 0 3 and statutory
certiorari from a court of record with provision for taking of additional
93 In the Circuit Court of the county in which a party resides or transacts busi-
ness. Wis. Stat., 111.07(8) (1949).
94 Review of Wisconsin Board of Tax Appeals determinations involving taxes of
individuals are in the circuit court of the county of residence, or of the situs
of the property where the taxpayer is nonresident. Wis. Stat., 73.015 (1949).
95 Wis. Stat., 11.07(7) ; Wis. E. R. Board v. J. P. Cullen & Son, 253 Wis. 105, 33
N.W. (2d) 182 (1948).
96 Clintonville Transfer Line v. Public Service Commission, 248 Wis. 59 at 76-77,
21 N.W. (2d) 5 (1945).
97 See Chicago N.W. Ry. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 156 Wis. 47, 145 N.W. 216,
974 (1914) ; Wisconsin Power & Light Co. v. Public Service Commission, 231
Wis. 390, 284 N.W. 586, 286 N.W. 392 (1939).
98 Clintonville Transfer Line v. Public Service Commission, 248 Wis. 59 at 69,
21 N.W. (2d) 5 (1945).
99 Wis. Stat., 102.23 (1949).
100 Wis. Stat., 76.08 (1949).
101 LeFevre v. Goodland, 247 Wis. 512, 19 N.W. (2d) 884, 161 A.L.R. 342 (1945);
State ex rel. Martin v. Juneau, 238 Wis. 564, 300 N.W. 187 (1941).
102 Wis. Stat., 153.09(1) (1949) ; Laws 1943, Ch. 273.
103 Public Works Board determination of improvement benefits: Wis. Stat.,
62.16(6) (k) (1949); local board action in re malt beverage licenses: Wis.
Stat., 66.054(14) ; see Fort Howard Paper Co. v. Sanitary District, 250 Wis.
145, 26 N.W. (2d) 661 (1947).
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evidence by the court,10 4 or the agency.10 5 Common law certiorari is
used where the statute makes no provision. 06 A local official has been
compelled through mandamus to issue a building permit,' 07 and revoca-
tion of a permit may be enjoined. 0 8 Such exceptions to standard re-
view procedure exist necessarily. They do not detract from the con-
siderable contribution of the Administrative Procedure Act in the area
where standard procedure is feasible.
Those familiar blocks to court review, the doctrines of prior resort
and exhaustion of administrative remedies, are enforced in many
agency statutes0 9 and decisions" in Wisconsin. In tax cases where
early finality is important they may be harshly enforced.-"' Numerous
decisions precluding litigants claiming licenses or other privileges under
statutes from contesting constitutionality were nullified by the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act, at least as to state-wide agencies." 2 Two
agencies, the Board "of Tax Appeals, 1 3 and the Banking Review
Board," 4 are intermediate review agencies, independent of the enforce-
ment agency, and their decisions alone are subject to court review."15
(2) Scope of Review. Before the Administrative Procedure Act
many agency statutes adopted by reference the review procedure pro-
vided for workmen's compensation. Such review is equivalent in scope
to review on cetiorari, and is confined to inquiry upon the record as to
104 County Zoning Adjustment Board, Wis. Stat., 59.99(10)-(13) (1949); City
Zoning Appeal Boards, Wis. Stat., 62.23(7) (e)10-15 (1949); State ex rel.
Robst v. Board of Appeals, 244 Wis. 566, 13 N.W. (2d) 64 (1944).
105Wis. Stat., 62.13(5) (h) (1949) ; see State ex rel. Heffernan v. Board, 247
Wis. 77, 18 N.W. (2d) 461 (1945).
108Town, City and Village Boards of Review, Wis. Stat., 70.46, 70.47 (1949),
except in first class cities where circuit court appeal is provided, Wis. Stat.,
70.47(13) (1949). Certiorari: Knapp v. Heller, 32 Wis. 467 (1873); State ex
rel. Russell v. Board of Appeal, 250 Wis. 394, 27 N.W. (2d) 378 (1947).
107 State ex rel. Scandrett v. Nelson, 240 Wis. 438, 3 N.W. (2d) 765 (1942). Also
to place a candidate's name on a ballot: State ex rel. Sullivan v. Hauerwas,
(Wis., 1949), 36 N.W. (2d) 427. But see State ex rel. Wattawa v. Manitowoc
Library Board, 255 Wis. 492, 39 N.W. (2d) 359 (1949).
108 Great Lakes Tanning Co. v. Milwaukee, 250 Wis. 74, 26 N.W. (2d) 152
(1946).
109 Public Service Commission, Wis. Stat., 196.405(2) (1949); Board of Tax
Appeals, Wis. Stat., 73.015(1) (1949).
110 Attorney General v. Fasekas, 223 Wis. 356 at 362-363, 269 N.W. 700 (1937);
State ex rel. Russell v. Board of Appeals, 250 Wis. 394, 27 N.W. (2d) 378
(1947) ; Odau v. Personnel Board, 250 Wis. 600, 27 N.W. (2d) 726 (1947).
"I Lamasco Realty Co. v. Milwaukee, 242 Wis. 357, 8 N.W. (2d) 372, 865 (1943);
Amnicon v. Kimmes, 249 Wis. 321, 24 N.W. (2d) 592 (1946).
'11 Wis. Stat., 227.20(2) (1949) ; see Gagnon v. Department of Agriculture and
Markets, 232 Wis. 259, 286 N.W. 549 (1939).
13 Wis. Stat., 73.01 (1949). See Kaukauna v. Department of Taxation, 250 Wis.
196, 26 N.W. (2d) 637 (1947) ; for discussion of history and function of the
Board.
114Wis. Stat., 220.035 (1949); Ch. 187, Laws 1949.
115 Corstvet v. Bank of Deerfield, 220 Wis. 209, 263 N.W. 687 (1936) ; Board of
Tax Appeals, Wis. Stat., 73.015 (1949) ; Baker v. Department of Taxation,
250 Wis. 439, 27 N.W. (2d) 467 (1947).
[Vol. 34
WISCONSIN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
action in excess of power, findings which do not support the order, and
whether there is any credible evidence which in any reasonable view
supports the action taken.116 The term "credible evidence" is narrowed
to exclude hearsay and non-expert opinion, and standing alone such
evidence will not support a finding. 1 7 This has been the scope of re-
view as to all facts, and Crowell v. Benson does not require a court
trial de novo upon jurisdictional facts in Wisconsin.:" _Although a
question remains as to so-called constitutional facts," 9 commission
findings upon such matters as the nature of river employment as local
or maritime have not been subjected in the past to trial de novo upon
court review.
20
By definition such review is narrower in scope than the inquiry
directed in the Administrative Procedure Act, namely as to whether
findings are supported by substantial evidence in view of the entire
record as submitted.' 2 1 Although the Act excepts review of workmen's
compensation, there are indications that the broader review provided
in the Act is affecting the attitude of the Court even in compensation
cases. For example, in an earlier decision the Court recognized that
agency experience and technical competence should be accorded weight
on review, a proposition codified in the Act,'2 and sustained an Indus-
trial Commission decision which was contrary to uncontradicted expert
testimony as to the traumatic origin of hernia.' 2 After the Administra-
tive Procedure Act was passed, the Court held that the weight accorded
technical competence will not be a substitute for evidence in the record,
and rejected the contention that a finding of liability may be supported
by technical competence alone. 2 4 Shortly before the Act, in the Wis-
116 Wis. Stat., 102.23(1) (1949) ; General Accident F. & L. Assurance Corp., Ltd.
v. Industrial Commission, 223 Wis. 635, 271 N.W. 385 (1937); Kuehnel v.
Wisconsin Board of Architects, 243 Wis. 188, 9 N.W. (2d) 630 (1943) ; Burt
Bros. v. Industrial Commission, 255 Wis. 488, 39 N.W. (2d) 388 (1949).
117 Lloyd-McAlpine Logging Co. v. Industrial Commission, 188 Wis. 642, 206
N.W. 914 (1926) ; Loomis v. Industrial Commission, 216 Wis. 202, 256 N.W.
693 (1934) ; Folding Furniture Works v. Wisconsin L. R. Board, 232 Wis. 170
at 188-189, 285 N.W. 851, 286 N.W. 875 (1939); Globe Steel Tubes Co. v.
Industrial Commission, 251 Wis. 495, 29 N.W. (2d) 510 (1947).
118 General Accident F. & L. Assurance Corp., Ltd. v. Industrial Commission,
223 Wis. 635, 271 N.W. 385 (1937) ; Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 76 L.Ed.
598, 52 S.Ct. 285 (1932).
119 General Accident F. & L. Assurance Corp., Ltd. v. Industrial Commission,
supra, at page 650.
1
2 0 LaCrosse Dredging Company v. Industrial Commission, 223 Wis. 308, 270
N.W. 62 (1936).
121 Wis. Stat., 227.20(1) (d) (1949).
12 2Wis. Stat., 227.20(2) (1949; see Ray-O-Vac Co. v. Wisconsin E. R. Board,
249 Wis. 112 at 119, 23 N.W. (2d) 489 (1945).
123 McCarthy v. Industrial Commission, 194 Wis. 198, 215 N.W. 824 (1927).
124 Globe Steel Tubes Co. v. Industrial Commission, 251 Wis. 495, 29 N.W. (2d)
510 (1947); and F. A. McDonald Company v. Industrial Commission, 250 Wis.
134 at 138, 26 N.W. (2d) 165 (1947), where the Court stated: "To admit the
Commission's claim in this respect would be to sustain an award on the basis
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consin Telephone case, the Court stated that statutory presumptions
favoring agency findings will lose force, sometimes entirely, when the
record indicates agency bias and predisposition to decide on improper
grounds.125 And in tax cases the presumption favoring the assessment
disappears upon introduction of evidence of inaccuracy. 26
With respect to local agency action it can be stated generally only
that certiorari appears most frequently in the cases. 127 As to state-wide
agencies, with the two exceptions noted, the Administrative Procedure
Act has provided the foundation for a standard scope for review. Re-
view under the Act 2 8 is on the record, except that the circuit courts
may take evidence as to irregularities before the agency. The court
must determine whether substantial rights of appellant have been pre-
judiced through action in violation of constitutional rights, in excess of
agency power, arbitrary or capricious, taken in the course of unlawful
procedure or other error of law," 9 or "unsupported by substantial
evidence in view of the entire record as submitted."'"" This applies the
substantial evidence rule, approved in the federal courts,' 3 ' to the record
in quasi-judicial and also in legislative proceedings where findings are
required by law to support a rule or order." 2 The Administrative
Procedure Act has broadened the scope of review beyond certiorari and
other forms formerly available, and the Court has stated that "few
if any statutes have come under our observation which prescribe broad-
of evidence that is not in the record, and to put beyond the reach of a judicial
review a large number of cases in which by any ordinary process of reason-
ing there is no evidence to sustain the commission, but in which the commis-
sion asserts that because of some undisclosed knowledge on its part, or its
experience and skill in drawing inferences, the fact has been established. It
it our conclusion that such a view cannot be sustained."
125 Wisconsin Telephone Company v. Public Service Commission, 232 Wis. 274 at
321, 329, 287 N.W. 122, 593 (1939).
126 State ex rel. Farmers & M. State Bank v. Schanke, 247 Wis. 182 at 189-190,
19 N.W. (2d) 264 (1944).
127 In ten of seventeen cases reaching the Supreme Court since 1944. See Mil-
waukee Iron Co. v. Schubel, 29 Wis. 444, 9 A.R. 591 (1872); State ex rel.
Kenosha Office Building Co. v. Herrmann, 245 Wis. 253, 14 N.W. (2d) 157,
910 (1944); State ex rel. Baranowski v. Koszewski, 251 Wis. 385, 29 N.W.
(2d) 764 (1947) ; State ex rel. Farmers & M. State Bank v. Schanke, 247 Wis.
182 at 189-190, 19 N.W. (2d) 264 (1944) ; State ex rel. Sippy v. Nee, 253 Wis.
423, 34 N.W. (2d) 121 (1948).
128 Wis. Stat., 227.20 (1949).
12 See American Brass Co. v. State Board of Health, 245 Wis. 440, 15 N.W.
(2d) 27 (1944).
130 Wis. Stat., 227.20(1) (d) ; see Milwaukee County v. Village of Stratford, 245
Wis. 505, 15 N.W. (2d) 812 (1944).
131 Wis. Stat., 227.20(1) (d) (1949); Consolidated Edison Co. v. National L. R.
Board, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 230, 83 L.Ed. 126, 140, 59 S.Ct. 206, 217 (1938), ap-
proved and quoted in Gateway City Transfer Co. v. Public Service Commis-
sion, 253 Wis. 397, 34 N.W. (2d) 238 at 242 (1948).
12 Clintonville Transfer Line v. Public Service Commission, 248 Wis. 59 at 75-77,
21 N.W. (2d) 5 (1945); Pardeeville E. L. Co. v. Public Service Commission,
246 Wis. 504, 17 N.W. (2d) 586 (1945) ; see recent discussion in Gateway City
Transfer Co. v. Public Service Commission, 253 Wis. 397, 34 N.W. (2d) 238
at 241-243 (1948).
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er or even as broad a scope of review as that prescribed by Ch. 227,
Stats."'18 Clearly the circuit courts today have broader review powers
in most cases than under previous statutes and decisions.
CONCLUSION
This short survey of the Wisconsin idea in administrative law re-
veals nothing startling, little that is unusual, and much that is sound and
inclusive of the best in recent development. Many important agency
statutes have undergone decades of legislative amendment and judicial
interpretation, and numerous agencies, typically the Industrial Com-
mission, Public Service Commission, and Department of Securities,
occupy an accepted and respected place in the legal system. The Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act has made a tremendous contribution toward
simplified, standard agency procedure, and in broadening the scope of
review it follows a conservative trend evident elsewhere in recent de-
cisions and legislation.
133 Clintonville Transfer Line v. Public Service Commission, 248 Wis. 59 at 76, 21
N.W. (2d) 5 (1945).
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